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THE  GERMAN  ARMY 


DEPARTMENT  OF  MILITARY  ART 
THE  ARMY  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 


Press  of  The  Army  Service  Schools 
Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas 

1916 


THE  GERMAN  ARMY 


DEPARTMENT  OF  MILITARY  ART 

THE  ARMY  SERVICE  SCHOOLS 


"0 


Press  of  The  Ajmy  Service  Schools 
Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas 


1916 


'V^^ 


The  German  Army 

Lecture* by  Captain  A.  W.  Bjornstad,  16th  Infantry. 


THERE  are  many  ways  of  describing  an  army, 
or  an  automobile,  or  any  other  thing  that  is  too 

complicated  to  be  grasped  at  a  glance.  To  list 
the  component  parts  is  the  easiest  way,  and  the  poor- 
est. That  clock,  I  may  say,  is  a  box  enclosing  a 
mechanism  consisting  of  fifteen  wheels,  two  hands, 
one  pendulum — and  you  will  want  to  interrupt  me 
to  say :  "We  can't  remember  catalogues.  Try  to  ex- 
plain what  makes  it  tick." 

This,  I  hope,  will  be  a  lecture  without  statistics 
or  diagrams.  Something  makes  the  German  army 
tick  in  a  way  that  is  more  or  less  disconcerting  to 
people  who  do  not  sleep  well.  You  are  probably 
more  interested  in  knowing  what  makes  it  tick  so 
noticeably  and  reliably  than  you  are  in  numbers  or 
sub-divisions.  Organization,  equipment  and  like 
subjects  have  become  familar  enough  to  you,  or  will 
become  familiar  to  you  while  you  are  here,  by  reason 
of  the  number  of  German  problems  and  texts  that 
form  a  part  of  the  course,  and  through  general  read- 
ing of  literature  relating  to  the  present  war.  Your 
familiarity  with  this  side  of  the  topic  compels  me 
to  depart  from  the  accepted  rule  which  governs 
these  lectures  on  foreign  armies  and  present  the 
German  army  from  a  different  angle. 

The  German  army  is  well  organized  in  most 
respects.  It  is  defectively  organized  in  other  re- 
spects. Most  of  its  equipment  is  excellent,  but 
some  of  it  is  only  fair,  and  some  of  it  is  poor.  Most 
of  its  regiments'  are  splendid.     Some  are  not  so 

'  333437 

7  '  ^ 


--4— 

splendid.  These  are  of  course  matters  of  interest, 
but  the  final  judgment  must  now  await  the  teach- 
ings of  this  war.  There  are  deficiencies,  to  be  sure, 
but  the  power  of  the  whole  has  never  been  equalled. 
The  German  army  is  one  of  the  greatest  weapons,  if 
not  the  greatest  weapon,  ever  made  by  man.  A 
near  approach  to  it  is  the  British  navy.  But  that 
navy  has  not  been  put  to  the  test  against  equal  or 
superior  numbers,  whereas  the  German  army  has 
been  so  tested.  The  British  navy  is  great  because 
of  its  preponderance  rather  than  by  reason  of  proved 
superior  quality.  The  German  army  is  great  be- 
cause of  proved  superior  quality  rather  than  by 
reason  of  superior  numbers.  The  coalition  made 
it  inferior  in  numbers.  Any  numerical  superiority 
that  Germany  has  had  from  time  to  time  locally  is 
due  to  leadership,  and  leadership  comes  from  quality 
and  not  from  preponderance. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  pass  judgment  on  the 
moral  question  of  the  present  use  of  the  German 
weapon — its  army.  Our  only  interest  is  the  weapon 
itself.  A  pistol  may  be  used  in  a  cause  that  is  moral- 
ly right  or  morally  wrong.  The  quality  of  the  pistol 
is  the  same  in  either  case. 

Lock  one  average  German  in  a  room  with  two 
average  Englishmen  and  presently  the  two  English- 
men probably  will  be  carrying  the  German  out  on  a 
stretcher.  But  assume  a  German  army  of  one  mil- 
lion men  and  a  British  army  of  two  million  men, 
each  trained  up  to  the  standards  of  their  respective 
countries  as  matters  stood  in  July,  1914,  and  place 
these  armies  face  to  face  in  a  large  country  where  it 
is  possible  to  maneuver,  to  extend  and  over-extend, 
to  envelop  and  outflank,  and  to  exercise  in  full  the 
power,  skill  and  finesse  of  military  art — and  pre- 
sently the  British  probably  would  be  the  victims  of 


— 5— 

the  greatest  cataclysm  in  their  military  history. 
Such  is  the  power  of  an  organized  mass  when  every 
one  in  it  has  been  trained  for  his  part  and  inspirited. 

There  is  another  point  that  should  be  explained 
at  this  time.  Part  of  Austria  and  practically  all  of 
Germany  are  German  racially.  Austria,  of  course, 
has  its  own  army  and  war  department  and  German- 
speaking  Austrians  dominate  both.  Saxony  is  a 
kingdom  and  is  pure  German.  It  has  its  own  army 
and  war  department,  though  the  kingdom  is  one  of 
the  26  states,  or  entities,  large  and  small,  that  make 
up  the  German  Empire.  This  is  an  anomaly  which, 
for  political  reasons,  could  not  be  avoided  when  the 
Empire  was  formed.  Bavaria,  also  a  kingdom  and 
state  in  the  Empire,  is  likewise  more  or  less  indepen- 
dent of  Berlin  in  army  matters.  Prussia  has  a  pop- 
ulation practically  twice  that  of  all  the  other  states 
of  the  Empire  combined.  The  army  contingents  of 
all  states  except  Saxony  and  Bavaria  are  under  the 
Berlin  military  authorities;  that  is,  the  Emperor 
and  his  War  Department  and  his  General  Staff. 
Thus  the  army  contingents  of  twenty-odd  small 
states  have  been  Prussianized.  They  have  been 
consolidated  with  and  made  subject  to  the  methods 
and  policies  of  the  Hohenzollerns.  This  is  the  real 
simon-pure  Hohenzollern  army.  This  is  the  army 
which,  in  my  opinion,  has  demonstrated  that  it  pos- 
sesses the  high  qualities  I  have  mentioned  and  shall 
refer  to  more  in  detail  later.  The  Bavarian  con- 
tingent is  apparently  doing  excellent  work.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  accounts  of  the  operations  of  von 
Hausen's  Saxon  army  in  August  and  September, 
1914,  give  a  less  favorable  impression  of  those 
troops.  Things  did  not  go  altogether  well  with  Aus- 
tria either,  in  the  beginning  of  the  war  at  least. 

The  efficiency  of  the  German  army  is  of  course 


due  to  many  causes.  It  is  in  part  due  to  national 
or  race  characteristics ;  but  it  is  in  far  greater  part 
due  to  the  policies  of  the  Hohenzollern  and  his  War 
Department  and  his  General  Staff.  It  has  not  been 
the  work  of  a  day,  or  a  year,  or  of  the  reign  of  a 
single  monarch.  The  characteristics  and  policies  to 
which  I  refer  have  created  certain  moral  and  psycho- 
logical influences;  influences  which,  in  turn,  have 
made  the  German  army  great,  entirely  apart  from 
the  greatness  that  is  due  to  numbers  alone. 

Aside  from  good  physique  and  intelligence,  of 
which  Germany  has  her  fair  share  and  probably 
little  more,  most  of  the  effective  points  that  are  no- 
ticeable in  the  army,  in  the  last  analysis  may  fairly 
be  attributed  to  one  of  four  things :  Industry,  indivi- 
dual pride,  hope  of  reward  and  fear  of  retirement. 
It  seems  academic  to  pick  a  vast  machine  to  pieces 
in  search  of  its  secret  and  then  assert  that  it  func- 
tions well  because  of  four  very  primitive  and  simple 
human  virtues  and  weaknesses.  We  must  not  lose 
sight  of  the  power,  or  persons,  who  had  the  foresight 
and  strength  to  put  the  machine  together  and  set 
these  forces  to  the  task  of  making  it  function  well. 
However,  in  the  short  time  allotted  I  have  chosen 
to  limit  myself  to  a  brief  reference  to  these  forces 
which  make  the  great  German  clock  tick  with  great- 
er regularity  and  precision  than  some  of  the  other 
clocks  that  are  now  competing  in  the  same  market. 

First  as  to  industry,  which  combines  patience 
with  thoroughness.  The  army  in  time  of  peace  is  a 
school.  A  university  has  its  professors  and  instruc- 
tors forming  a  continuing  personnel  which  educates 
an  ever-changing  student  body.  So  the  army  in 
Germany,  as  in  all  countries  that  have  universal 
and  compulsory  service,  has  its  officers  and  non- 
commissioned officers  forming  a  continuing  person- 


— 7— 

nel  which  trains  recruits  who  come  into  the  army, 
serve  one,  two  or  three  years,  depending  upon  con- 
ditions that  are  not  important  to  us  just  now,  and 
then  pass  into  the  reserve  and  back  to  civil  life  as 
trained  men  available  for  future  mobilization. 
There  is  no  misapprehension  as  to  peace  time  duty. 
That  4uty  is  so  obviously  to  teach  that  the  continu- 
ing personnel,  the  officers  and  non-commissioned  offi- 
cers, frankly  consider  themselves  to  be  in  the  nature 
of  glorified  schoolmasters.  They  receive  their  clas- 
ses in  the  Fall.  They  have  no  distractions  short  of 
war  itself.  They  have  a  definite  result  to  achieve 
with  the  men  entrusted  to  them  for  training  and  they 
are  quite  strictly  judged  by  their  success  in  their 
work.  They  possess  the  patience  and  industry  com- 
mon to  Germans.  In  training  they  follow  thorough 
and  well-tried  methods.  Time  does  not  permit  a 
review  of  these  methods.  They  involve  much  detail 
and  much  repetition  and,  above  all,  patience  and  in- 
dustry on  the  part  of  the  instructors.  The  train- 
ing of  officers  and  staffs  receives  due  attention,  as 
you  may  well  suppose,  and  this  also  requires  indus- 
try on  the  part  of  officers  to  a  degree  that  is  not 
found  uniformly  in  the  British  or  American  service. 
The  result  of  the  whole  is  an  evenness  and  thorough- 
ness that  gives  smoothness  and  power  to  the  opera- 
tion of  their  huge  masses. 

I  do  not  wish  to  give  you  the  impression  that 
these  Germans  have  ideal  patience,  patience  of  the 
quiet  sort.  This  is  certainly  not  triie.  Officers  and 
non-commissioned  officers  are  frequently  irascible, 
illtempered  and  explosive ;  much  more  so  than  with 
us.  Some  of  their  outbursts  would  probably  dis- 
credit them  with  our  recruits.  But  when,  in  spite 
of  these  weaknesses,  I  say  they  are  patient,  I  mean 
they  are  both  able  and  willing  to  see  a  thing  through 


— 8— 

regardless  of  time  or  effort.  It  would  also  be  wrong 
to  say  that  patience  is  necessary  to  compensate  for 
the  dullness  and  inaptitude  of  the  raw  material. 
Someone  is  responsible  for  the  general  belief  that 
German  recruits  are  dull-witted  clods.  It  may  have 
been  true  in  the  time  of  Frederick  the  Great.  Old 
Marshall  Dessau,  who  was  Prussia's  great,  drill- 
master  and  who  first  put  cadenced  movements  in 
the  drill  regulations  on  the  theory  that  recruits 
were  awkward  and  in  need  of  great  physical  and 
mental  awakening,  is  probably  responsible  for  the 
current  belief  which  I  have  mentioned  and  which 
today  amounts  to  a  libel.  But  Dessau  was  notori- 
ously illtempered  and  exacting.  At  any  rate,  if 
statistics  are  trustworthy,  there  is  less  illiteracy  and 
ignorance  of  the  dense  sort  in  modern  Germany  than 
in  any  other  country,  perhaps,  and  it  seemed  to  me 
that  the  men  in  the  regiment  which  I  knew  best 
compared  very  favorably  with  our  own  men  in 
mental  alertness  and  physical  agility^  These  men 
were  drawn  principally  from  Nassau  and  Hesse- 
Darmstadt,  two  provinces  whose  people  are  not  no- 
ticeably superior  to  Germans  elsewhere. 

Our  own  army  is  slowly  moving  in  the  direction 
of  a  school  for  the  development  of  reservists.  It 
must  therefore  assume  the  character  of  an  institu- 
tion having  a  continuing  instruction  personnel  and 
those  who  constitute  that  personnel  will  spend  most 
of  their  years  as  peace-time  instructors,  schoolmas- 
ters. Much  of  the  instruction,  particularly  the  in- 
struction of  officers  and  staffs,  must  of  necessity  be 
theoretical,  or  only  semi-practical.  But  it  is  neces- 
sary to  see  clearly  that  every  officer  must  be  an  in- 
structor for  his  own  command,  whatever  may  be  its 
size,  in  theoretical  as  well  as  practical  work.  That 
is  the  German  system  and  the  logical  one.     The  time 


will  soon  come  when  we  must  discontinue  the  prac- 
tice of  throwing  the  work  of  instruction,  particular- 
ly in  theoretical  work,  on  the  shoulders  of  a  few. 
We  must  charge  each  man  with  making  his  own  unit 
or  staff.  In  other  words  if  we  have  a  class  of  offi- 
cers who  consider  themselves  too  practical  to  fool 
with  theory,  that  class  must  disappear.  One  of  our 
greatest  instructors  in  theoretical  work,  a  man 
whose  memory  is  inseparably  linked  with  these 
schools,  was  reputed  to  be  a  failure  in  the  field,  and 
one  of  our  greatest  practical  soldiers.  Grant,  was 
probably  no  great  shakes  as  an  instructor,  though, 
of  course,  he  had  no  opportunity  to  demonstrate  a 
weakness  in  that  respect.  This  proves  nothing 
that  cannot  be  disproved  by  citing  the  case  of  Stone- 
wall Jackson,  or  better  still,  in  the  modern  view, 
Moltke  and  Hindenburg.  In  any  case,  it  is  absurd 
to  cite  a  few  great  soldiers  as  examples.  The  great 
mass  of  officers  are  simply  company  and  regimental 
officers.  Their  functions  and  responsibilities  are  of 
a  different  kind.  If  in  time  of  peace,  every  officer 
and  non-commissioned  officer  is  a  competent  teacher 
of  theory  and  practice  in  his  own  unit  we  can  leave 
it  to  the  war  to  find  the  leader. 

The  Germans  have  the  gift  of  teaching.  They 
have  the  necessary  perseverance  and  the  ability  to 
master  details.  Furthermore,  they  assume  that  a 
good  teacher  is  a  good  all-round  man  until  the  con- 
trary is  proven.  Their  army  is  great  largely  be- 
cause the  officers  and  non-commissiond  officers  are 
great  teachers.  I  did  not  discover  any  evidence  of 
a  rough  division  of  the  officers  into  two  classes,  one 
assigned  to  the  task  of  playing  with  theory  in  peace- 
time and  the  other  merely  awaiting  the  great  oppor- 
tunity to  save  the  nation  by  its  untutored  common 
sense.     I  doubt  that  the  Emperor  of  Germany  be- 


—10— 

lieves  that  his  army  is  improved  much  by  retaining 
an  officer  who  chooses  not  to  be  an  instructor  in  the 
full  sense,  and  merely  because  his  intimates  suspect 
that  he  is  going  to  be  a  bearcat  in  battle. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  say  how  much  of  German 
military  efficiency  is  due  to  pride.  There  is  some- 
thing that  moves  German  troops  to  unusual  exer- 
tions, even  in  time  of  peace,  and  to  the  painstaking 
performance  of  duty  on  all  occasions ;  but  France  is 
not  appreciably  less  noteworthy  in  this  respect. 
You  may  prefer  to  call  it  military  spirit,  but  I  have 
seen  many  things  which  prompt  me  to  attribute  it 
largely  to  pride  in  individual  performance.  It 
moves  officers  and  men  to  do  well  and  willingly 
many  tedious  and  laborious  things  that  enter  into 
the  training  and  field  service  of  troops.  In  the  first 
place,  there  is  the  pride  that  the  Germans  have  in 
merely  belonging  to  the  army.  They  feel  that  the 
army  is  their  own.  It  is  not  an  obscure,  misunder- 
stood thing  that  stands  apart.  It  is  not  a  govern- 
ment police  force.  Whether  rightly  or  wrongly, 
they  believe  that  not  only  the  safety,  but  the  future 
greatness  of  their  country  depends  upon  the  efficien- 
cy of  the  nation  in  arms.  Even  the  Social-Demo- 
crats, except  the  extreme  wing,  share  this  view. 
What  they  oppose  is  the  exclusive  authority  of  the 
Emperor,  the  alleged  overbearing  conduct  and  per- 
spective of  the  officer  caste,  and  the  government  es- 
timate of  what  constitutes  an  appropriate  peace 
footing. 

The  very  fact  that  every  citizen  must  serve,  un- 
less disqualified,  makes  the  uniform  and  its  wearer 
respected  and  honored.  In  searching  about  for  an 
explanation  of  the  low  regard  in  which  soldiering 
is  held  by  many,  if  not  most,  Americans,  we  should 
not   overlook   the   circumstance   that   our   soldiers 


—11— 

choose  this  occupation,  instead  of  giving  their  ser- 
vice as  a  debt  due  the  government,  and  it  is  an  oc- 
cupation which  apparently  pays  poorly  and  subor- 
dinates them  to  a  corps  of  officers.  Poor  pay  and 
this  form  of  subordination,  which  is  outwardly  so- 
cial, strike  many  Americans  as  evidence  of  inferiori- 
ty. It  is  of  course  a  species  of  snobbery  to  take 
this  view,  for  the  subordination  is  based  on  military 
necessity  and  not  on  personal  considerations.  Then, 
also,  much  of  our  early  history  deals  with  mercenary 
armies  of  the  type  that  preceded  the  modern  con- 
scription system  of  Europe.  Our  own  army  is  a 
survival  of  the  old  order  in  its  legal  relation  to  the 
government  and  to  the  people.  It  is  an  army  for 
the  maintenance  of  which  the  people  are  taxed  in 
money  instead  of  personal  service  and  the  difference 
is  as  marked  as  the  difference  between  day  and  night. 
In  spite  of  the  marked  difference  between  our 
men  and  the  men  of  the  old  mercenary  armies  in  in- 
telligence and  decency,  our  people,  because  they 
know  nothing  of  history,  associate  with  all  armies 
more  or  less  the  idea  of  license  and  personal  inferi- 
ority that  one  obtains  from  reading  of  armies  of  long 
ago.  Undoubtedly  the  same  attitude  towards  sol- 
diers was  common  enough  in  Europe  up  to  Napoleon's 
time,  and  probably  with  reason.  But  universal, 
compulsory  service  has  raised  the  soldier's  job  in 
Europe  to  the  dignity  of  a  high  and  honorable  duty 
of  citizenship.  The  Germans  take  all  dignities  and 
duties  seriously.  To  them  the  army  is  a  necessary 
and  beneficent  institution.  They  are  unreservedly 
proud  of  the  fact  that  they  are  serving  in  it,  or 
have  served  in  it;  proud  even  of  the  fact  that  they 
and  all  others  must  serve  in  it.  And  probably  most 
important  of  all,  in  its  bearing  on  efficiency,  a  Ger- 
man is  proud  of  the  fact  that  he  has  served  well,  if 


—12— 

it  is  a  fact,  and  that  his  localized  regiment  is  effi- 
cient and  serves  well.  It  seems  to  me  that  nothing 
that  I  have  said,  or  can  say,  can  give  an  adequate 
idea  of  the  sincere  pride  that  an  average  German 
takes  in  his  own  service  and  in  his  regiment  and  in 
the  army.  Only  by  personal  contact  can  one  see  the 
effect  and  realize  also  how  the  sense  of  duty  and  this 
personal  pride  in  one's  own  service  lighten  the  task 
and  promote  the  success  of  instructors  and  leaders. 

The  non-commissioned  officers  look  forward  to 
the  civil  service  positions  which  are  guaranteed  them 
after  twelve  years'  service.  They  will  then  have  an 
assured  position  for  life,  and  one  which  gives  them 
good  standing  in  the  community — a  suitable  reward. 
They  are  pleased  with  their  prospects  and  proud  of 
their  jobs.  It  goes  without  saying  that  such  men, 
almost  without  exception,  will  handle  their  jobs 
with  devotion  and  enthusiasm. 

The  officers  constitute  a  caste;  no  other  word 
describes  it  adequately.  They  feel,  and  indeed  all 
Germans  except  Social  Democrats  feel,  that  the  offi- 
cers are  the  natural  protectors  of  the  country. 
They  take  the  lead  in  many  things.  They  have  a 
unique  and  secure  social  position.  An  officer  as  a 
rule  belongs  either  to  the  nobility,  and  the  minor 
nobility  is  large  in  numbers,  or  to  a  prominent  and 
wealthy  family  which  subsidizes  him  in  effect  in  or- 
der that  he  may  have  an  attractive  career  and  con- 
tribute to  the  social  distinction  of  the  family,  or  up- 
hold it.  He  is  inclined  to  hold  himself  aloof  from 
the  ordinary  citizen.  A  similar  condition  could  not 
exist  in  this  country,  and  does  not  exist  in  France. 
Also,  it  is  difficult  for  us  to  understand  the  impor- 
tance that  a  German  officer  attaches  to  himself  as  a 
national  institution.  His  view  may  be  unsound  and 
illogical,  but  it  is  a  fact,  and  when  a  man  would  soon- 


—13— 

er  be  what  he  is  than  anything  else  in  the  world,  and 
in  addition  is  held  in  great  awe  by  citizens  in  gener- 
al, the  chances  are  that  he  will  strive  to  hold  up  his 
end  properly.  To  hold  it  up,  to  keep  his  place,  he 
must  come  up  to  a  military  standard  and  make  his 
command  efficient.  He  must  be  a  real  officer  and, 
furthermore,  he  must  look  the  part.  The  govern- 
ment gives  him  a  trifle  in  the  way  of  pay.  Appar- 
ently it  counts  much  on  his  pride  of  place  and  in  my 
opinion  it  does  not  count  in  vain. 

Of  course,  in  a  caste  which  the  people  love  to 
make  much  of  and  spoil,  there  is  much  affectation 
and  much  foppishness ;  for  example,  much  adherence 
to  extreme  military  fashions  rather  than  to  the  sim- 
ple dictates  of  neatness  and  serviceability,  but  on  the 
whole  this  pride  and  care  in  personal  appearance 
fosters  confidence  and  respect.  Soldiers  are  not 
philosophers.  They  are  ordinary  human  beings 
who  believe  what  they  see. 

A  slovenly  officer,  speaking  of  appearance  only, 
ordinarily  fails  to  obtain  from  his  subordinate  offi- 
cers and  men  the  loyalty  and  respect  which  are  ne- 
cessary to  successful  military  relations.  Officers 
clearly  owe  the  duty  of  making  these  relations  what 
they  ought  to  be.  There  is  another  good  military 
reason  for  exercising  care  in  this  respect,  a  reason 
that  is  not  overlooked  in  Germany.  In  military 
operations  in  hostile  country  or  during  military  oc- 
cupation, success  depends  in  large  measure  upon 
our  relations  with  the  inhabitants.  Our  contact 
with  the  inhabitants  results  from  so  many  situa- 
tions and  necessities  that  it  is  useless  to  attempt  an 
enumeration  of  them.  Imagine  a  slovenly  officer 
attempting  to  do  important  business,  vital  to  the  in- 
terests of  our  government  and  troops,  with  leading 
citizens,   particularly   in   Latin-America.   He   could 


—14— 

exert  no  beneficial  influence  over  the  population,  ex- 
cept by  force.  He  would  be  a  distinct  liability, 
whereas  for  years  the  government  has  hoped  or 
tried  to  make  him  an  asset.  Even  in  such  apparent- 
ly trivial  matters  pride  is  a  distinct  military  virtue. 

But  it  is  pride  in  its  broader  sense  that  I  have 
particularly  in  mind  when  I  say  that  it  is  one  of  the 
traits  that  makes  for  military  efficiency.  The  same 
feeling  exists  throughout  most  of  continental  Europe 
and  it  is  due  originally  to  the  fact  that  the  armies 
are  truly  national  and  of  the  people.  It  is  stronger 
in  Germany  than  elsewhere  because  of  many  mili- 
tary successes  and  the  extraordinary  political  and 
industrial  growth  of  the  new  Empire,  and  because 
the  German  is  a  self-satisfied  and  conceited  being 
anyway.  He  has  not  the  least  doubt  that  he  does 
anything  and  everything  better  than  any  one  else. 
He  is  about  50%  right  in  thinking  so  and  he  has  the 
saving  quality  of  industry. 

When  I  use  the  term  "hope  of  reward"  I  trust 
no  one  will  confuse  it  with  "waiting  for  payday." 
If  the  Pennsylvania  Railroad  should  establish  the 
policy  that  hereafter  no  official  or  employee  would  be 
fired  except  for  crime;  that  none  would  have  his  pay 
reduced;  and  that  all  promotion  in  future  would  be 
by  seniority,  the  road  would  be  in  the  hands  of  a  re- 
ceiver within  two  years.  This  problem  of  promot- 
ing efl^iciency  by  giving  suitable  rewards  for  good 
work  is  simple  of  solution  in  the  business  world,  but 
difficult  in  the  military  service.  In  the  business 
world  the  ultimate  authority  is  directly  interested 
in  the  efficiency  of  the  whole  and  promotes  it  by  ex- 
ercising the  power  to  hire,  fire  and  promote.  In  an 
army  it  is  different,  when  the  ultimate  authority  is 
hard  to  identify,  not  centralized,  and  not  specially 
interested  in  the  condition  of  the  army.     It  is  easier 


—15— 

where  the  ultimate  and  unrestrained  authority  is  an 
Emperor  and  who  feels  that  he  is  not  much  securer 
in  his  place,  and  his  country  is  no  safer,  than  his 
army  is  strong. 

Germany  offers  a  substantial  peace-time  reward 
which  all  officers  have  an  opportunity  to  try  for  while 
they  are  still  young.  This  feature  of  their  promo- 
tion system  has  a  most  important  bearing  on  the  effi- 
ciency of  the  army,  as  I  shall  show  presently.  It  has 
to  do  with  the  War  College  and  the  General  Staff. 
The  War  College  is  more  like  our  School  of  the  Line 
and  Staff  College  than  like  our  own  War  College. 
The  course  covers  three  years.  Lieutenants  are  ele- 
gible  after  three  years'  service,  but  not  so  late  in 
their  career  that  their  promotion  to  captain  is  likely 
to  occur  within  five  years.  As  promotion  stood  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  this  meant  that  lieutenants 
were  elegible  from  their  fourth  to  their  ninth  or 
tenth  year  of  service.  There  are  25  army  corps. 
Within  each  corps  there  is  an  examination  annually 
in  which  applicants  compete.  Griepenkerl  wrote  his 
problems  for  applicants  to  study  in  preparing  for 
this  competitive  examination.  As  I  remember  it, 
each  regiment  may  usually  send  only  one  officer  to 
the  annual  examination,  but  the  same  officer  may 
try  a  second  or  third  time. 

During  the  three  years  that  each  class  is  at  the 
War  College,  some  fail  to  make  an  adequate  impres- 
sion, and  are  relieved.  These  are  not  many.  Of 
those  who  complete  the  course,  a  limited  number  of 
officers  are  selected  and  attached  to  the  General  Staff, 
but  not  appointed  to  it.  Their  suitability  for  the 
General  Staff  is  determined  during  this  probationary 
period  which  may  last  one,  two  or  three  years.  Prac- 
tically all  vacancies  in  the  General  Staff  are  filled  by 
selection  during  this  probationary  period.    Some  are 


—16— 

appointed  while  still  on  probation;  others  are  ap- 
pointed after  having  returned  to  their  regiments 
from  probationary  service.  There  is  no  rule  as  to  this. 
When  a  successful  man  finally  reaches  the  General 
Staff  he  is  very  likely  a  junior  in  his  own  arm.  But 
promotion  is  such  that  those  who  are  appointed  in 
the  General  Staff  gain  from  three  to  six  years,  or  in 
exceptional  cases  more,  in  promotion.  He  is  per- 
manently in  the  General  Staff,  but  he  is  sent  back 
from  time  to  time  for  duty  with  troops,  retaining  the 
advanced  rank. 

With  this  exception  promotion  is  by  seniority  up 
to  and  including  lieutenant  general ;  that  is,  division 
commander.  But  an  officer  who  has  made  the  Gen- 
eral Staff  jump  reaches  the  higher  grades  at  such  an 
early  age,  comparatively,  that  most  of  the  general 
officers,  at  least  above  brigade  commander,  are  for- 
mer General  Staff  officers. 

Every  officer,  when  he  enters  the  army,  is  natur- 
ally ambitious  to  come  out  near  the  top  at  the  end  of 
his  career.  This,  I  think,  is  truer,  or  more  generally 
true,  in  an  army  like  that  of  Germany  where  no  sane 
man  would  become  an  officer  merely,  or  even  partly, 
as  a  means  of  obtaining  a  livelihood,  and  where  offi- 
cers think  that  it  is  due  their  families  to  take  the 
career  seriously  and  make  what  they  can  of  it.  The 
biggest  step  is  the  General  Staff,  but  for  that  very 
reason  it  is  the  most  difficult.  The  competition  is 
strong,  and  yet  an  obscure  officer  does  not  labor  un- 
der any  appreciable  disadvantage.  It  is  not  neces- 
sary that  he  be  known  to  some  general  officer.  Every 
officer  has  an  opportunity  to  make  himself  favorably 
known  to  his  colonel,  and  the  colonel,  in  the  nature 
of  the  case,  each  year  must  confine  his  selection  to  5 
or  6  possible  candidates  at  most.  But  having  won  the 
colonel's   approval   and   designation,   the   candidate 


—17— 

must  compete  within  the  army  corps.  Here  he  is  ra- 
ted on  the  competitive  test  only.  If  successful  in  the 
corps  examination,  he  competes  during  the  next  three 
years  for  a  chance  at  a  probationary  tour  with  the 
General  Staff.  While  on  probation  he  is  still  com- 
peting for  a  permanent  appointment. 

To  see  how  severe  this  competition  and  elimina- 
tion is  in  practice,  let  us  follow  the  class  which  enter- 
ed the  War  College  in  any  given  year;  say  the  class 
of  1910.  In  the  preceding  year  from  2  to  8  officers 
in  each  regiment  sought  the  colonels  designation,  or 
say  1,200  throughout  Germany.  Some  of  these  may 
apply  again,  but  their  elegibility  lasts  a  very  short 
time.  About  500  of  the  1,200  were  allowed  to  take 
the  examination.  Of  these  500,  133  entered  the  War 
College  for  the  three  year  course.  Of  those  who 
failed  in  the  corps  examination,  a  few  may  turn  up 
next  year  and  try  again.  Of  the  133  who  enter  the 
War  College,  perhaps  110  or  115  finished.  Of  these 
about  50  were  attached  to  the  General  Staff  for  one, 
two  or  three  years.  And  of  these  50,  about  20  or  25 
were  finally  appointed  in  the  General  Staff.  There 
are  from  20  to  25  appointments  annually.  In  short, 
if  appointments  were  prorated  among  the  regiments, 
a  given  regiment  would  get  an  appointment  about 
every  8  or  9  years. 

It  looks  like  an  unpromising  gamble  against 
tremendous  odds,  but  in  German  eyes  the  prize  is  a 
rich  one.  It  is  undeniably  a  fact  that  nearly  every 
officer  begins  his  career  with  the  determination  to 
try  for  it  when  his  time  and  opportunity  come  and 
a  German  does  not  throw  off  a  determination  very 
easily.  There  are,  furthermore,  a  number  of  minor 
prizes  which  do  not  carry  better  promotion  with 
them,  but  more  varied  and  agreeable  service.  Corps, 
division  and  brigade  adjutants,  certain  War  Depart- 


—18— 

merit  positions,  and  a  number  of  other  places,  are 
details  which  are  made  almost  exclusively  from  those 
who  have  tried  for  the  General  Staff  and  missed  it. 
These  details  break  the  long  monotony  of  duty  with 
troops,  assure  better  stations,  and  are  very  desirable. 
There  is  very  little  detached  service  and  it  is  a  dis- 
tinct advantage  to  have  done  well  at  the  War  College 
and  thus  be  in  line  for  the  limited  details  that  are 
available.  There  is  no  detailed  supply  corps  in  our 
sense.  There  is  nothing  which  corresponds  to  our 
college,  or  militia,  or  recruiting  details. 

I  wish  now  to  invite  your  attention  to  the  ejfect 
of  this  system,  prefacing  my  remarks  by  observing 
that  the  rules  of  the  game  are  adhered  to  and  the 
policy  is  well  understood  and  not  deviated  from  ex- 
cept under  very  special  circumstances.  A  newly  ap- 
pointed second  lieutenant  sees  that  he  has  about  6  or 
8  years  to  serve  and  then  he  must  try  for  the  regi- 
mental designation.  He  has  several  things  to  ac- 
complish during,  that  time.  He  must  have  a  care 
as  to  his  personal  conduct,  of  course.  He  must  learn 
how  things  are  done,  and  then  how  to  do  them,  which 
is  different  and  more  practical.  Also,  he  must 
convince  the  colonel  that  he  knows.  During  these 
years  he  must  so  conduct  and  develop  himself  that 
his  colonel  can  comply  with  regulations  which  re- 
quire him  to  certify  to  the  following: 

The  officer  designated 

1.  Is   thoroughly  trained   in   practical   work   and   pos- 
sesses excellent  military  qualities. 

2.  He  has  seriousness  of  purpose,  combined  with  ap- 
titude. 

3.  His   personality   and   character   are   consistent  with 
future  employment  or  use  in  high  office. 

4.  He  has  a  rugged  constitution  and  has  health  which 
demands  no  coddling. 

5.  He  is  in  suitable  financial  circumstances. 


—19— 

The  competitive  examination  includes  the  fol- 
lowing subjects :  Formal  tactics,  applied  tactics,  wea- 
pons and  munitions,  fortification,  map  reading  and 
aptitude  in  terrain,  history,  geography,  mathematics 
and  French  or  Russian.  You  have  a  fair  index  to  the 
preparatory  work  that  the  young  officer  must  ac- 
complish when  you  consider  that  GriepenkerFs  prob- 
lems were  prepared  for  his  benefit  to  assist  him  in 
passing  the  examination  in  one  of  the  eight  subjects 
enumerated ;  that  is,  applied  tactics. 

No  doubt  many  are  sooner  or  later  discouraged 
from  making  further  effort  to  win  the  designation, 
but  the  point  I  wish  to  emphasize  is  this:  Every 
officer  has  from  the  start  an  incentive  to  learn  what 
he  can  and  be  as  competent  as  he  can  and  this  has 
the  effect  which  probably  was  intended.  The  effect, 
as  I  observed  it,  is  a  high  average  of  capability 
among  younger  officers  and  these  are  the  officers  who 
handle  the  individual  instruction  of  recruits.  I  be- 
lieve in  the  system  and  it  is  not  impossible  to  apply  it 
to  our  service.  Our  army  is  non-competitive  in  a  pro- 
fessional sense.  Or  rather,  the  competition  is  hap- 
hazard and  indefinite.  To  put  it  epigrammatically, 
the  palm  is  too  likely  to  go  to  the  man  of  tact  rather 
than  the  man  of  tactics.  It  should  go  to  the  man  who 
is  both.  Nothing  will  develop  all,  or  nearly  all,  of  our 
officers  except  competition,  based  on  some  fixed  or 
tangible  interest.  A  certain  secojid  lieutenant  of 
my  acquaintance  is  ambitious  and  capable.  Last 
winter  he  asked  me  what  he  could  specialize  in  in  or- 
der to  get  forward.  He  was  so  serious  in  his  request 
for  information  that  he  asked  me  to  set  aside  an  hour 
or  so  to  talk  it  over.  I  do  not  know  why  he  con- 
ceived it  to  be  necessary  to  specialize.  I  could  only 
tell  him  to  specialize  in  tactics  and  society,  that  the 
two  do  not  necessarily  conflict,  and  one  or  the  other, 


—20— 

or  possibly  both,  might  some  day  bring  his  worth  to 
the  attention  of  the  proper  authority.  In  all  serious- 
ness, I  think  the  advice  was  good,  better  than  I 
thought  at  the  time,  because  an  officer  who  knows 
people  in  the  abstract,  and  tactics,  is  certainly  use- 
ful. 

This  positive  competition  which  I  have  describ- 
ed tends  to  make  young  German  officers  begin  their 
careers  with  hard  work  along  logical  lines.  Coupled 
with  it  is  a  form  of  negative  competition  which  keeps 
the  older  officers  up  to  form,  or  at  least  has  a  power- 
ful tendency  in  that  direction.  Every  year  a  number 
of  officers  are  retired,  either  for  failure  to  bring  their 
units  up  to  standard,  or  for  failure  to  handle  them 
well  at  maneuvers,  or  for  physical  incapacity,  or 
sometimes  for  an  avoidable  physical  condition, 
particularly  obesity.  The  number  to  be  retired  is 
not  fixed.  They  attempt  simply  to  retire  those  who 
have  ceased  to  be  useful.  The  nearest  approach  to 
this  in  our  service  is  the  examination  for  promotion ; 
but  this  examination  is  a  failure  as  it  now  stands. 
The  essential  differences  between  the  German  system 
and  ours  are:  First,  the  Germans  put  their  system 
into  practical  effect,  while  we  do  not.  Second,  a 
victim  of  our  system  suffers  a  severe  financial  blow, 
if  incompetency  be  the  cause,  while  in  Germany  the 
victim  is  supposed  to  have,  or  at  least  generally  has, 
outside  income,  and  has  not  much  pay  to  lose  any 
way,  and  of  that  he  loses  only  one-half.  Third,  the 
German  is  liable  to  retirement  at  any  time,  while 
our  officers  are  safe  except  on  those  rare  occasions 
when  their  promotion  is  due ;  and  to  be  frank  about 
it,  they  are  as  safe  then  as  before  or  after. 

Beginning  with  companies  in  May  or  June,  and 
ending  with  army  corps  in  the  September  maneuvers, 
each  unit  is  quite  thoroughly  inspected  and  the  lead- 


—21— 

ership  of  the  unit  commander  is  observed.  In  Oc- 
tober most  of  the  blue  envelopes  are  given  out,  va- 
cancies are  filled,  and  the  new  school  year  begins 
throughout  the  army.  The  blue  envelope  contains  a 
very  gracious  letter  thanking  the  recipient  for  his 
valuable  services,  and  informing  him  that  he  is  re- 
tired, and  His  Majesty  hopes  that  he  will  enjoy  his 
well-earned  rest.  Yet  retirement  is  taken  quite 
philosophically  and  is  a  disappointment  rather  than 
a  disgrace. 

The  companies  and  battalions  of  the  regiment 
with  which  I  am  most  familiar  were  inspected  in 
May  by  the  battalion  and  regimental  commanders. 
About  two  days  were  devoted  to  each  unit.  During 
the  company  and  battalion  inspections,  the  brigade, 
division  and  corps  commanders  were  frequently 
present.  On  one  occasion  all  three  were  present  to- 
gether. These  commanders  in  fact  spend  much  of 
the  summer  going  about  in  automobiles  or  otherwise 
from  one  inspection  to  another,  and  correspondingly 
less  time  at  their  headquarters.  Our  division  com- 
mander had  been  a  cavalryman  until  the  preceding 
Fall,  when  he  was  promoted  to  division  command. 
He  informed  me  that  he  had  spent  the  intervening 
6  or  7  months  in  a  thorough  and  detailed  study  of 
infantry  drill  regulations,  in  order  to  be  able  to  in- 
spect his  command.  It  was  rather  interesting  to  see 
a  corps  commander  follow  a  firing  line  and  later 
jump  the  captain  because  in  one  of  the  rushes  by  a 
group  of  a  dozen  men  the  preparations  were  not  ex- 
acting enough.  As  for  the  division  commander  who 
had  been  a  cavalryman  it  may  be  said  that  if  he 
displayed  undue  ignorance  of  drill  regulations  the 
fact  would  not  have  escaped  notice.  Instruction  is 
a  peace-time  demand  upon  him  as  upon  all  others. 


—22— 

One  must  know  whether  things  are  right  or  wrong 
when  one  inspects. 

Unquestionably  mistakes  are  made.  Some  man 
who  loses  the  General  Staff  plum  may  be  better  than 
another  who  wins  it,  but  his  superiority  could  not 
be  measured  by  mortal  mind.  One  thing  is  certain. 
The  two  hundred-odd  officers  in  the  General  Staff 
at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  could  not  be  matched  by 
any  two  hundred  that  tried  and  failed,  or  any  other 
two  hundred  in  the  army.  And  so  in  the  case  of 
retirements.  Some  of  those  who  fall  by  the  wayside 
may  be  better  than  some  who  remain.  But  take 
any  hundred  that  have  been  retired  and  we  shall 
find  that  they  are  far  less  useful  than  any  hundred 
who  remain.  We,  in  the  United  States,  consider 
first  exact  justice  to  the  individual.  Germany  ap- 
pears to  consider  first  exact  justice  to  the  nation  and 
approximate  justice  to  the  individual.  But  beyond 
the  question  of  exact  justice  there  lies  the  matter  of 
creating  efficiency  by  a  system  of  rewards  and  re- 
tirements.- 

If  the  axe  were  in  the  habit  of  playing  favorites, 
I  think  I  would  have  heard  the  weakness  of  the  sys- 
tem commented  upon.  The  German  officer  is  by  no 
means  taciturn,  once  you  know  him,  and  in  his  com- 
ments upon  this  or  that  feature  of  the  army  he  is 
prone  to  criticise  quite  freely. 

There  is  no  fixed  retirement  age.  Haeseler,  a 
picturesque  old  field  marshal,  was  in  active  service 
in  1913  at  the  age  of  80-odd.  This  was  an  exception, 
however.  Haeseler  is  a  real  hero  of  the  Franco- 
Prussian  War,  a  former  instructor  of  the  Emperor, 
I  believe,  and  a  national  idol.  He  was  not  given  a 
command  in  the  present  war,  but  turned  up  as  an 
observer  and  free  lance. 

Theoretically  an  officer  remains  as  long  as  he 


is  useful.  He  then  becomes  a  reserve  officer,  if  not 
too  old,  and  is  an  asset  in  war.  This  fear  of  retire- 
ment is  one  of  the  great  causes  of  German  military 
efficiency  which  I  mentioned  in  the  beginning.  Its 
practical  effect  is  on  officers  above  the  grade 
of  lieutenant.  Not  very  long  after  the  officer  has 
reluctantly  buried  his  ambition  to  make  the  War 
College,  he  finds  that  the  other  agency  is  beginning 
to  destroy  any  dreams  of  repose  that  he  may  have 
entertained.  The  fear  of  retirement  tends  to  keep 
the  old  fellows  on  the  job.  There  is  not  much  let-up 
in  their  efforts  to  keep  themselves  fit  for  the  dual 
task  of  the  officer  in  peace-time — ^teaching  and  lead- 
ing. Still  there  appeared  to  me  to  be  little  hard 
driving  of  subordinates.  Commanders  are  pretty 
much  let  alone.  They  enjoy  a  freedom  that  we 
hardly  know.  Of  course,  freedom  without  respon- 
sibility quickly  degenerates  into  mere  license  in  many 
instances.  In  our  service,  if  we  are  free  we  are 
responsible  practically  only  to  our  own  consciences. 
Under  the  law  our  superiors  have  no  recourse,  in 
case  we  fall  down,  except  to  take  away  the  freedom 
and  thoroughly  supervise  us.  It  would  not  do  to 
differentiate.  It  would  probably  demoralize  a  regi- 
ment if  eight  company  commanders  were  free  and 
four  others  supervised.  The  idea  behind  the  German 
system  seems  to  be  this:  Give  an  officer  all  the  as- 
sistance he  wants  and  needs,  but  trust  him  to  train 
his  command  in  his  own  way;  it  will  develop  him. 
But  when  it  is  clear  that  he  is  no  longer  useful  and 
effective,  put  another  man  in  his  place.  How  to  dis- 
pose of  him  with  justice  is  a  detail.  The  paramount 
thing  is  the  efficiency  of  the  army.  The  country  can 
easily  recover  from  the  mistakes  of  postmasters  and 
revenue  officers,  and  even  some  of  the  mistakes  of 
a  legislature,  but  the  mistakes  of  the  army  and  navy 


—24— 

in  war  leave  their  scars  for  all  time  and  are  irre- 
trievable. 

Little  more  than  a  hundred  years  ago,  Prussia 
was  a  wreck.  Until  then  it  had  a  paid  army.  Na- 
poleon compelled  her  to  reduce  the  army  to  42,000. 
Furthermore,  he  stood  by  and  saw  to  it  that  the 
limit  was  not  exceeded.  But  Prussia  threw  the  old 
army  into  the  scrap  heap  and  erected  a  military 
school  with  40,000  students  and  20,000  graduated 
reserves  annually.  Apparently  Napoleon  sat  by 
and  allowed  himself  to  be  circumvented.  Seven 
years  after  Jena  the  Prussian  army  was  larger  than 
ever  before  and  it  delivered  probably  the  first  and 
certainly  the  second  real  blow  against  Napoleon. 
That  was  the  beginning  of  Germany's  modern  army. 
Scharnhorst,  Stein  and  Clausewitz  erected  it  and  put 
the  breath  of  life  into  it  when  they  surrounded  the 
continuing  instruction  personnel  with  War  College, 
General  Staff,  and  above  all,  prestige  and  incentives 
to  work. 

Germany  by  no  means  enjoys  exclusive  posses- 
sion of  the  military  virtues.  There  is  probably 
nothing  that  Germany  has  accomplished  in  the  mat- 
ter of  making  her  fighting  force  efficient  that  cannot 
be  accomplished  by  us ;  but  it  would  require  wise  and 
unselfish  legislation,  coupled  with  wise  and  in- 
flexible War  Department  policies.  This  legislation 
and  these  policies  are  such  as  the  army,  the  militia 
and  the  public,  in  their  present  benighted  state, 
probably  would  not  listen  to.  In  other  words,  we  can 
have  it  if  we  want  it,  but  there  are  other  things, 
perhaps  less  creditable  to  us,  individually  and  na- 
tionally, which  we  seem  to  want  more. 


DAY    AND    TO    $1.00 
OVERDUE. 


4?HL 


SEP  4    ^ ^l__-fiEG^&nar1 


APR! 


LD21-100m-7.'39(*«^^ 


Gay  lord  Bros. 

Makers 

Syracuse,  N.  Y. 

PAT.JAN.21J908- 


/    .J 


^      UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


